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The new US president has promised a fundamental change in American for-
eign policy after the Trump years: “America is back.” The start of Joe Biden’s 
presidency in January 2021 is therefore also associated with consider able 
expectations in sub-Saharan Africa. Four key issues will determine whether 
the new US administration will really deliver on these expectations.
 • Security policy priorities, especially the fight against spreading Islamist terror, 
shape US Africa policy. Some of the world region’s most authoritarian states are 
among the US’s closest partners in sub-Saharan Africa in this regard. President 
Biden has promised to make the international promotion of democracy a cen-
tral priority in the future. 
 • If the fight against climate change is really to become a hallmark of the Biden 
administration, this cannot happen without Africa being onboard. So far, how-
ever, the US has continued to support numerous large-scale projects in Africa 
that rely on fossil fuels. 
 • US development cooperation with Africa focuses on fighting diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS. In light of COVID-19, greater focus on strengthening health sys-
tems, vaccination programmes, and overcoming the pandemic would help 
counterbalance China’s “vaccine diplomacy.” 
 • The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) supports African exports to 
the US. However, the effect has been limited and US–African trade has fallen 
far behind that between Africa and China. 
Policy Implications
A fundamental shift in US Africa policy is not to be expected under President 
Biden. However, there are new opportunities for cooperation in health and over-
coming the current COVID-19 pandemic, in climate policy, and in promoting 
dem ocracy. Given the US focus on geostrategic competition with China, how-
ever, expectations should remain realistic. 
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United States “Africa Policy”: Biden Administration Makes  
Immediate Changes
The Biden administration has not wasted time in making drastic changes in United 
States Africa policy. As in other policy areas, a fundamental change of tone is afoot. 
While predecessor Donald Trump denigrated African nations as “shithole coun-
tries,” the Biden administration has promised “mutually respectful relations” and 
immediately rescinded a travel ban on citizens from numerous Muslim-majority 
nations on coming to power. This travel ban also affected African, especially West 
African, states. 
We can expect that Biden’s foreign policy team, led by Secretary of State Antony 
Blinken, will see Africa (in this GIGA Focus, “Africa” refers to sub-Saharan Africa) 
first and foremost for what it is. Namely, a dynamic and rapidly growing continent 
with an extremely young population who are expected to make up more than one-
quarter of the world’s inhabitants by 2050. Moreover, the sheer number of states 
making up the continent as a whole (55) already signifies the considerable weight 
Africa carries both on the international stage and within the United Nations system. 
At the same time, and as before, “Africa” is unlikely to become a core focus of 
the US administration. In his foreign policy principles “Why America Must Lead 
Again,” which Biden published in March 2020 in Foreign Affairs, the world region 
appears in only one sentence at all, a reference to the Ebola epidemic aside: “And 
we need to do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa into the 
broader network of democracies and to seize opportunities for cooperation in those 
regions” (Biden 2020: 73). The dominant foreign policy focus in Washington re-
mains on the geostrategic competition with China. This is by no means a new de-
velopment: While Trump imposed punitive tariffs on goods from China, President 
Barack Obama spoke of the much-cited “pivot to Asia.” As vice president, Biden 
had been instrumental in shaping this focus at the time. Although the election of 
the first black US president in 2008 was euphorically celebrated in African coun-
tries, he largely ignored the continent. Ever since the presidency of Bill Clinton 
(1993–2001), in fact, a remarkable consensus has emerged between Democrats and 
Republicans on the basic tenets of US Africa policy. The rhetoric of the new US 
administration is therefore likely to change much more drastically than its actual 
Africa policy.
What foreign policy towards African states can we expect from the Biden ad-
ministration then? And, what potential for cooperation is there for African part-
ner countries – but also for Germany and the European Union? To this end, this 
analysis examines the development of US Africa policy since the turn of the new 
millennium and provides an outlook on potential developments in the policy fields 
of security, economics, development cooperation, and democracy. 
The Focus on Counterterrorism 
A major focus of US Africa policy to date has been counterterrorism and support for 
the military and special forces. It should not be forgotten that as early as 7 August 
1998 bombs were detonated simultaneously in tankers outside the US embassies 
in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). These African “9/11” terrorist 
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attacks killed more than 220 people and left several thousand injured, while also 
completely destroying the embassy buildings. Even before the airplane attacks of 11 
September 2001 these Islamist terrorist attacks led to a “securitisation” of US Africa 
policy that continues to determine the country’s relationship with the continent as 
a whole today. 
Since 2001 at the latest, the US military has established a network of bases in 15 
African countries – primarily in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. These serve first 
and foremost to combat jihadist terrorist groups, which are spreading in particular 
in the Sahel, Nigeria, Somalia, and also Mozambique, while also threatening those 
countries’ neighbouring states. The central military base on the entire continent is 
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, East Africa. 
The activities engaged in are extensive: over the years, Washington has paid 
billions of dollars in “security assistance” to African partner governments, while 
US special operations forces themselves conducted counterterrorism combat mis-
sions in at least 13 African states between 2013 and 2017. In 2019, the United States 
launched airstrikes against Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist targets in Somalia 
on average once per week (Turse 2020). “Military advisors” train African soldiers 
and conduct missions themselves: for example, against the Lord’s Resistance Army 
in Uganda. In 2007, during the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–2009), U.S. 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in Stuttgart, Germany, to manage 
the deployments. As of January 2020, according to AFRICOM, 5,100 Army person-
nel and 1,000 Pentagon-employed civilians were stationed in Africa (Husted et al. 
2021). Numerically at least, this presence contradicts the official narrative that US 
forces have only a “‘light’ footprint” on the African continent (Turse 2020).
So far, there are no signs that the Biden administration will become more in-
volved militarily or in counterterrorism. At the same time, it is also unclear whether 
Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Africa will be reversed. 
Rapid Rise in Africa’s Economic Relations with China
The US’s two largest trading partners in Africa Nigeria and South Africa together 
account for more than half of all US–Africa trade. Overall, trade with Africa rep-
resents only 1 percent of total US foreign trade, however. Traditionally, African 
countries export more goods to the US than vice versa (see Figure 1 below). While 
African countries primarily sell natural resources (crude oil already accounts for 
one-third of total exports), various processed items are imported from the US. This 
imbalance with the world’s poorest region on average is deliberately promoted by 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which has been in force for 20 
years now. It allows duty-free imports of goods from numerous African nations and 
has primarily supported trade in African-produced clothing, the most important 
processed export to the US. AGOA is widely recognised in the region. 
However, trade between African countries and the US has declined sharply over 
the past five years. At the same time, a comparison shows that China has become an 
increasingly important trading partner for sub-Saharan Africa and the whole conti-
nent as a whole. The effects hereof are serious: today, the volume of trade between 
African countries and the People’s Republic is almost four times as high as that with 
the US (see Figure 2 below). 
   4    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 2 | MARCH 2021 
Against this backdrop, the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-
ment Act (BUILD Act) was passed in 2018; it had been initiated by the U.S. Con-
gress and not the Trump administration. The BUILD Act doubles the default pro-
tection for US investments in infrastructure projects in developing countries up to a 
total of USD 60 billion. The Act can be understood as a response to China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative and the accompanying massive financing and construction of major 
infrastructure projects in Africa. A prominent example of China’s billion-dollar in-
vestment is the 752 kilometres of new train track between Ethiopia’s capital Addis 
Ababa and the port in Djibouti. However, a consistent US strategy for strengthening 
economic relations with African states has not emerged from this initiative to date.
Stable Development Cooperation 
On several occasions, the Trump administration attempted to massively scale back 
US development assistance and humanitarian aid to African countries. This was 
in line with his administration’s repeated accusation that development aid is gen-
erally ineffective and prone to corruption. The previous president wanted to cut 
the budget of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) by 
almost one-third. However, the U.S. Congress prevented this, with votes coming 
Figure 1 
US–Africa Trade
Note: The vertical 
dashed lines denote the 
beginning of the incum-
bencies of Barack Obama 
(in 2009, succeeding 
George W. Bush) and 
Donald Trump (in 2017). 
Source: China Africa 
Research Initiative 2021.
Figure 2 
US and Chinese Trade 
with Africa
Note: The vertical 
dashed lines denote the 
beginning of the incum-
bencies of Barack Obama 
(in 2009, succeeding 
George W. Bush) and 
Donald Trump (2017). 
Source: China Africa 
Research Initiative 2021.
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from members of the Republican Party too, and kept funding for development aid 
programmes at high levels. US development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was 
about USD 3 billion below EU funding in 2019 (see Figure 3). Moreover, the Trump 
administration continued almost all existing initiatives, launched new ones such as 
“Prosper Africa,” and even expanded USAID’s presence in countries such as Niger. 
Development policy under Trump thus remained contradictory and much more tra-
ditional than announced (and feared by some). 
A particular focus of US development cooperation lies in the fight against disease, 
precisely the area from which the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (BMZ) wanted to largely withdraw before the COVID-19 pan-
demic hit. Over the past decade, nearly three-quarters of US aid to African nations 
has gone to fight disease and malnutrition, particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
childhood diseases (Husted et al. 2020). Of particular importance are the Presi-
dent’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched by George W. Bush in 
2003, and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), started two years later. Sup-
port for healthcare totalled USD 5.3 billion in the fiscal year 2019. In addition, the 
private Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is actively engaged in disease control 
with billions in funding. Even the US government Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion (MCC), established in 2004 to support successful reform states, especially in 
Africa, has endured and is expected to have a USD 800 million budget in fiscal year 
2021 (MCC 2020). However, the wide variety of Africa programmes and ministries, 
as well as institutions involved, have led to fragmentation, making a strategic US 
Africa policy immensely more difficult. 
So far, the Biden administration has not indicated that it intends to devote 
more funds to development aid for African countries. Given the economic conse-
quences of the COVID-19 pandemic this seems unlikely. However, personnel deci-
sions point to an upgrading of the dossier at least. Secretary of State Blinken, unlike 
US ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield, has previously had no particu-
lar professional contact with sub-Saharan Africa. The acting assistant secretary for 
the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, Robert F. Godec, is an ac-
complished diplomat with extensive experience in Africa (he was previously ambas-
sador to Kenya, among other places), but not a political heavyweight. He stands for 





Note: Constant 2018 
prices. “EU member 
states” refers to the 20 
OECD DAC members 
from the EU (including 
the United Kingdom, 
which left the EU on 1 
February 2020; “EU 
member states + EU” 
also includes payments 
from the EU institutions. 
The vertical dashed 
lines denote the begin-
ning of the incumbencies 
of George W. Bush (in 
2001), Barack Obama 
(in 2009) and Donald 
Trump (in 2017). 
Source: OECD Data 
2021.
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Power as head of USAID came as a surprise. She was the Obama administration’s 
UN ambassador from 2013 to 2017 and is one of the best-known voices for interna-
tional human rights protection in the US. She is also slated to become a member of 
the White House National Security Council, a clear upgrading of this position; do-
ing so would also establish a stronger link between development issues and security 
within the Biden administration. 
In terms of content, the fight against climate change could become the hallmark 
of President Biden’s Africa policy. If the fight against climate change is indeed to 
become central to the Biden administration, it cannot be so without African states 
onboard. This applies both to working with African partners in UN climate change 
conferences and to supporting development models that do not rely on the gigan-
tic resource consumption and CO2 emissions of industrialised countries and other 
rising states like China. An initiative to reduce fossil fuel-dependence in African 
countries could become President Biden’s signature African aid programme. Such a 
plan would also offer multiple entry points for cooperation with European partners. 
Second, helping African countries overcome the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
aftermath will be critical in the time ahead. In this regard, the US can draw on its 
experience and strong commitment to fighting the Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia between 2013 and 2016. In addition, China’s “vaccine diplo-
macy,” particularly in Asia, demonstrates the enormous political potential that lies 
in such outside contribution. Global distributions of vaccines are highly unequal, to 
the detriment of world regions like sub-Saharan Africa. The US could engage more 
bilaterally, support the COVID-19 international vaccine alliance COVAX, and use 
its expertise – in addition to fighting individual diseases like HIV/AIDS – to in-
vest even more in African public-health systems. This would massively increase the 
world region’s resilience to pandemics like COVID-19, and offer great opportunities 
for collaboration with the EU and Germany too. 
Dare to Be More Democratic 
Even under the Trump administration, promoting democracy, human rights, and 
good governance in African countries figured prominently in public pronounce-
ments – for example, from National Security Adviser John Bolton (in office: 2018–
2019). Indeed, in earlier years, MCC programmes with Madagascar and Mali were 
terminated because of unconstitutional changes of power. Moreover, election moni-
toring makes up an important part of the US approach. However, a disconnect has 
long been apparent between proclaimed goals and current cooperation with African 
states. 
First, support for good governance and civil society accounts for only a small 
portion – between USD 250 million to USD 300 million – of USAID programmes 
each year. Moreover, reports suggest that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor has too few staff to meaningfully carry out its 450 active programmes 
(Devermont 2019: 6). Second, despite announcements by various US administra-
tions that they would end development cooperation with authoritarian states, coun-
tries with repressive governments such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia 
were among the top recipients of US development assistance in fiscal year 2021 
(and before) (Husted et al. 2020: 14). However, this is true not only of the United 
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States but also of numerous other Western governments, which also cooperate with 
strategically or otherwise “important” authoritarian states. Observers from Africa 
also criticise the US for supporting “Africa’s strongmen” (Tampa 2020). In any 
event, the widely used argument that authoritarian governments “get things done 
better” has feet of clay. Recent research clearly shows that democratic governments 
do more for their citizens, at least in the longer term: on average, they invest more 
in education and achieve higher growth rates (Harding and Stasavage 2014; Masaki 
and van de Walle 2014). 
Promoting democracy internally and externally and cooperating with other de-
mocracies has been posited as a central pillar of Biden’s presidency. In his elec-
tion campaign, he promised greater support for Africa’s democracies. He also an-
nounced that he would invite democracies to a “Summit of Democracies” as early 
as 2021. Those in sub-Saharan Africa such as Ghana, Senegal, and South Africa, 
as well as democratising states and civil society organisations, should also play a 
prominent role therein. 
More consistent support for democracies in Africa would be a real paradigm 
shift in US policy (and in that of other states as well; for criticism of the EU, for 
example, see Brummer 2009). This area offers particular potential for increased 
co ope ration with the new US administration. Pursuing this seems especially impor-
tant in light of the fact that democracies in Africa have also come under pressure, 
that numerous African governments have used the fight against the COVID-19 pan-
demic to restrict democratic rights, and that China’s negative influence on demo-
cratic processes in African states still continues to grow. For example, the EU and 
US could pay much more attention to developing a coordinated approach in re-
sponding to electoral fraud and to the use of democracy sanctions in order to pre-
vent “forum shopping” by respective governments. 
Cooperation on the International Stage 
Already two months after taking office, we see the Biden administration’s new pres-
ence on the international stage – which is also of significance for African states. 
President Biden is thus fulfilling key announcements that America wants to “lead” 
internationally again (Biden 2020). First, the United States supported the appoint-
ment of Nigeria’s former finance minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the first female 
director-general of the World Trade Organization. In addition, the US will resume 
payments to UN programmes; this will have a major impact in many African na-
tions. The country also returned to the World Health Organization. Finally, serving 
as at least a symbolic gesture, Secretary of State Blinken announced his country’s 
intention to apply for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council. All of these actions 
point to a strengthening of multilateralism by the United States. However, the new 
administration’s failure to withdraw unilateral US sanctions against International 
Criminal Court prosecutors sends a different signal. 
The true test of multilateral cooperation, however, will come in sub-Saharan 
Africa itself. The US will only succeed if it does not see its African engagement as 
(merely) part of a geostrategic agenda to push back against China’s growing global 
influence. What should not be overlooked in the focus on its geostrategic race with 
China is that the “rest” – including African states – continue to have considerable 
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room for manoeuvre (Narlikar 2021). Although the United States lost significant 
prestige under the Trump administration, its soft power is still considerable. Recall 
the location of the world’s leading universities, which are also a major draw for Af-
rican students. But here, too, China has caught up – the current number of African 
students in China is 20 times higher than 10 years ago. 
Prospects for US Africa Policy 
Although China now appears to be too far ahead as a key foreign trade partner of 
African countries, the People’s Republic may well increase the incentives for the 
US to engage more substantially in sub-Saharan Africa (and with the continent as a 
whole) – also to form a counterweight. To this end, the Biden administration could 
focus on its policy priorities and the US’s particular strengths: in health, in com-
bating climate change, in strengthening the economy by facilitating market access 
and supporting the new African Continental Free Trade Area, in strengthening the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (including in tackling jihadist forces), in 
genuinely strengthening democratic forces, and in cooperation at the international 
level and at the UN. After all, the African continent as a whole accounts for more 
than one-quarter of the UN’s entire membership. 
The big question remains how ambitious the Biden administration will in fact 
be in its Africa policy. Here, expectations should not be too high. On a sober note, 
Republican presidents have done more for African countries than Democrats over 
the past two decades (Trump aside). Sub-Saharan Africa enjoyed the most attention 
from the US under George W. Bush. However, even he did not remedy but actually 
increased a central weakness of the country’s Africa policy: namely, the “hopeless 
fragmentation of institutions and programs” and the “proliferation of uncoordinat-
ed development assistance programs for Africa,” as van de Walle (2009: 6) already 
lamented 12 years ago. Every US incumbent of the past 20 years launched their own 
“presidential initiative” for Africa (PEPFAR, Power Africa, Feed the Future, Prosper 
Africa). It would be a surprise if Biden did not follow suit and launch his own initia-
tive, for example with regard to fighting climate change in African countries. That 
is honourable. Instead of another presidential initiative, however, a comprehensive 
and strategic approach to Africa would be ultimately desirable. 
African analysts and policymakers, in light of these experiences, welcomed the 
election of Biden but have taken it much more soberly than that of Obama in 2008. 
Not only did predecessor Trump smash a lot of porcelain, the overall low strategic 
importance of sub-Saharan Africa for the US is obvious. Thus, Tampa (2020) asks, 
“Obama didn’t deliver for Africa—can Biden prove that black lives matter every-
where?” Adegoke (2020) also predicts that the Biden administration will follow the 
traditions of US Africa policy and expects “a different (more respectful) tone, but 
no major changes in policy.” Thus, a break with established US Africa policy is not 
in sight. Yet, the “American dream” in Africa is being challenged by the cooperation 
with and strong engagement of China. 
So far, coordination with international partners – that with the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund aside – has not been one of the strengths of US Af-
rica policy. President Biden’s repeated commitment to multilateral cooperation and 
the international strengthening of democracy could open the door in Africa policy 
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to increased cooperation with African states, the EU, and Germany alike. German 
foreign minister Heiko Maas is currently pursuing the goal of building an “alliance 
for multilateralism.” Why not, then, jointly support African initiatives such as the 
African Continental Free Trade Area and the African Peace and Security Architec-
ture, and work together to end armed conflicts such as in Ethiopia’s Tigray region?
References
Adegoke, Yinka (2020), How a Biden Administration Will Change US-Africa Rela-
tions, in: Quartz Africa, https://qz.com/africa/1929614/how-a-joe-biden-will-
change-donald-trumps-us-africa-relations/ (1 February 2021).
Biden, Joseph R. (2020), Why America Must Lead Again, in: Foreign Affairs, 
March/April, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-
america-must-lead-again (29 January 2021).
Brummer, Klaus (2009), Imposing Sanctions: The Not so ‘Normative Power Eu-
rope’, in: European Foreign Affairs Review, 14, 2, 191–207.
China Africa Research Initiative (2021), China-Africa Annual Trade Data, Johns 
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, www.sais-cari.
org/data-china-africa-trade (23 March 2021).
Devermont, Judd (2019), The Game Has Changed: Rethinking the U.S. Role in 
Supporting Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC: Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies (CSIS), www.csis.org/analysis/game-has-changed-
rethinking-us-role-supporting-elections-sub-saharan-africa (17 February 2021).
Harding, Robin, and David Stasavage (2014), What Democracy Does (and Doesn’t 
Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections, in: The 
Journal of Politics, 76, 1, 229–245.
Husted, Tomas F. et al. (2021), Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engage-
ment, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Husted, Tomas F., Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Nicolas Cook (2020), 
U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview, Washington, DC: Congres-
sional Research Service.
Masaki, Takaaki, and Nicolas van de Walle (2014), The Impact of Democracy on 
Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1982-2012, Helsinki: World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).
MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) (2020), Congressional Budget Justifica-
tion, FY 2021, Washington, DC: MCC, www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/cbj-fy2021 
(17 February 2021).
Narlikar, Amrita (2021), Must the Weak Suffer What They Must? The Global South 
in a World of Weaponized Interdependence, in: Daniel W. Drezner, Henry Far-
rell, and Abraham L. Newman (eds), The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Inter-
dependence, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 289–304.
OECD Data (2021), Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions [DAC2a], 
OECD Stat., https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=Table2A# (23 
March 2021).
   10    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 2 | MARCH 2021
Tampa, Vava (2020), Obama Didn’t Deliver for Africa – Can Biden Prove That Black 
Lives Matter Everywhere?, in: The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2020/nov/30/obama-didnt-deliver-for-africa-can-biden-show-
black-lives-matter-everywhere (5 January 2021).
Turse, Nick (2020), Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts Its Claim 
of ‘Light’ Footprint, in: The Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2020/02/27/
africa-us-military-bases-africom/ (17 February 2021).
van de Walle, Nicolas (2009), US-Afrikapolitik: Bushs Vermächtnis und 
die Regierung Obama, GIGA Focus Afrika, 5, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publications/11578901-us-afrikapolitik-bushs-vermächtnis-regierung-obama/ 
(22 March 2021).
About the Author 
Dr. Christian von Soest is a lead research fellow at the GIGA Institute for African 
Affairs and head of GIGA Research Programme 2 “Peace and Security.” His work 
focuses on sanctions and other foreign policy interventions, conflict processes, 
and the domestic and international politics of authoritarian regimes. He leads the 
 GIGA’s contribution to the project B3: “Conflict and Cooperation at the Climate-Se-
curity Nexus,” forming part of the “Climate, Climate Change, and Society” (CLICCS) 
Excellence Cluster of the University of Hamburg. 
christian.vonsoest@giga-hamburg.de,
www.giga-hamburg.de/en/team/11564977-von-soest-christian/
The author would like to thank Maya Kasper for her valuable research for this GIGA 
Focus Africa. 
Related GIGA Research 
The inauguration of President Joe Biden on 20 January 2021 is the source of much 
hope around the world that the United States government will now return to inter-
national cooperation rather than continue putting “America First.” On his very first 
day in office, the new president already rejoined both the Paris Agreement and the 
World Health Organization. The GIGA Focus Thematic Editions 2021 will examine 
the key consequences of the change of administration in the United States for mul-
tilateralism and specific challenges in the Global South.
   11    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 2 | MARCH 2021 
Related GIGA Publications 
Basedau, Matthias, and Jann Lay (2021), Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2021, 
GIGA Focus Africa, 1, January, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/23327611-
things-watch-africa-2021/.
Basedau, Matthias, and Mora Deitch (2020), Pandemic Fallout: How Likely Is Pol-
itical Instability in Africa after the ‘Virus?’, Hamburg: GIGA, www.giga-ham-
burg.de/en/news/pandemic-fallout-will-the-coronavirus-lead-to-more-violent-
conflict-in-africa.
Basedau, Matthias (2017), The Rise of Religious Armed Conflicts in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: No Simple Answers, GIGA Focus Africa, 4, August, www.giga-hamburg.
de/en/publications/11576059-rise-religious-armed-conflicts-saharan-africa-
simple-answers/.
Castro Alegría, Rafael (2021), When Tone Is Not Everything: Joe Biden and Lat-
in America, GIGA Focus Latin America, 1, March, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publications/23984337-when-tone-is-not-everything-joe-biden-and-latin-america/.
Jasim, Dastan (2021), Biden’s Challenge: Kurdish Autonomy and Turkish Ex-
pansionism, GIGA Focus Middle East, 1, January, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publications/23480846-biden-challenge-kurdish-autonomy-turkish-expansionism/.
Lierl, Malte (2020), Growing State Fragility in the Sahel: Rethinking Interna-
tional Involvement, GIGA Focus Africa, 7, December, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publications/22285048-growing-state-fragility-sahel-rethinking-international-
involvement/.
Schüller, Margot, and Yun Schüler-Zhou (2020), United States–China Decoupling: 
Time for European Tech Sovereignty, GIGA Focus Asia, 7, December, www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/publications/22504031-united-states-china-decoupling-time-
european-tech-sovereignty/.
von Soest, Christian (2020), Investigating Corona and Conflict: How the Global 
Pandemic Might Affect Political Violence, Hamburg: GIGA, 16 June, www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/news/investigating-corona-and-conflict-how-the-global-pandemic-
might-affect/.
von Soest, Christian (2020), A Heated Debate: Climate Change and Conflict in Africa, 
GIGA Focus Africa, 2, April, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/18735981-
a-heated-debate-climate-change-conflict-africa/.
   12    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 2 | MARCH 2021
Imprint
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the 
Inter net and downloaded free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publications/giga-focus/. According to the conditions of the Creative Com-
mons licence Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 this publication may be 
freely duplicated, circulated and made accessible to the public. The par-
ticular conditions include the correct indication of the initial publication as 
GIGA Focus and no changes in or abbreviation of texts.
The German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) publishes the Focus series on 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and global issues. The GIGA Focus is edited 
and published by the GIGA. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institute. Authors alone are responsible 
for the content of their articles. GIGA and the authors cannot be held liable for any errors 
and omissions, or for any consequences arising from the use of the information provided.
The GIGA is thankful for the institutional support provided by the Free and Hanseatic City of 
Hamburg (Ministry of Science, Research, Equalities and Districts) and the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Federal Foreign Office).
General Editor GIGA Focus Series: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach 
Editor GIGA Focus Africa: Prof. Dr. Matthias Basedau
Editorial Department: Dr. James Powell, Petra Brandt 
 
GIGA | Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 
20354 Hamburg 
www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/  
giga-focus@giga-hamburg.de
